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 Abstract 
This paper examines official country selection and resource allocation of German aid after 
the end of the Cold War and embeds the analysis into the broader debate about German 
foreign policy. Based on new data, we take into account several peculiarities of the Ger-
man aid system. Overall, we find that neediness and democracy levels of recipients have 
been guiding principles in both country selection and resource allocation. Nevertheless, 
geostrategic considerations and the avoidance of conflict-affected countries have also im-
pacted on country selection but less on resource allocation. Moreover, non-linear estima-
tion techniques identify a relatively high threshold of income levels, below which the pov-
erty orientation disappears – a finding that refines previous studies identifying a middle-
income-country bias of German aid allocation. Finally, official selection decisions to con-
centrate aid on a reduced number of countries did not have the intended concentration ef-
fect. This strong path dependency and development orientation is compatible with re-
search that sees German foreign policy after reunification as being subject only to very 
gradual changes and led by the role model of a civilian power. 
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1 Introduction 
In general terms, allocation patterns of foreign aid are said to limit aid effectiveness if they 
respond more to special interests of donor governments than to development-oriented fac-
tors such as neediness and the institutional environment of recipients (Svensson 1999; 
Collier / Dollar 2001). Unfortunately, many studies could not find strong evidence on de-
velopment-oriented aid allocation. Instead, empirical evidence often showed a significant 
link between bilateral and multilateral aid allocation and donors’ foreign policy interests.1  
Still, research on aid allocation is everything but homogeneous in its findings. This het-
erogeneity is partly due to different statistical procedures, different periods under consid-
eration and different measures of foreign aid. Moreover, donor countries differ with regard 
to their foreign policy traditions as well as their economic, geostrategic and bureaucratic 
peculiarities; thus, they face varying incentive structures for allocating aid and selecting 
recipient countries. This diversity across donor countries creates a need to complement 
broad cross-country studies of donors with specific case studies on individual donors. In 
the latter case, the econometric analysis of aid allocation and country selection should be 
embedded in a case study design that provides a more fine-tuned analysis of the specific 
features of the donor country under consideration.  
Against this background, this paper analyses German country selection and aid-allocation 
processes after the end of the Cold War. Despite being among the largest bilateral donors, 
Germany has not been investigated extensively regarding aid allocation. Existing narra-
tives and reviews generally criticise the fragmented structure of the German aid system 
with its many agencies and the resulting tendency towards project proliferation. While re-
cent studies find some orientation towards neediness and governance, many prior studies 
found little evidence for a significant orientation of German aid allocation towards needi-
ness and governance in partner countries.2 Partially as a response to these critical findings, 
there have been some attempts of German governments in the last decade to improve the 
targeting of its resources and to reform its overall aid system. Beyond a narrow focus on 
the German aid system, some researchers (Schrade 1997) have also linked their findings to 
the more general debate on the course of German foreign policy after reunification (Peters 
2001). This debate mainly focussed on the question whether “the increase in power ex-
perienced by Germany after unification” would lead to a more assertive foreign policy 
(Peters 2001, 11). In this regard, less development-oriented and more self-interested allo-
cation patterns of German aid would contrast with the role model of a “civilian power”  
often associated with German foreign policy (Maull 1990). 
This study tackles these questions by analysing country selection and resource allocation 
of German aid. Firstly, the study provides an analysis of three official initiatives of coun-
try selection in 2000, 2008 and 2011. Here, the German government explicitly defined a 
transparent partner country list; at least in 2000 and 2008, this was a unique procedure for 
                                                 
1 See for instance Alesina / Dollar (2000) and Alesina / Weder (2002), for an emphasis on allocation 
patterns of multilateral agencies see Thacker (1999), Fleck / Kilby (2006), and Dreher / Jensen (2007). 
2  Critical perspectives on the German aid system are provided by the 1998 and 2006 Peer Review Reports 
of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD-DAC 1998, 2006). Allocation patterns of German aid have been analyzed in 
several studies but often have not embedded their econometric analysis in a more fine-tuned case study 
design, e.g. Zanger (2000), Gates / Hoeffler (2004), and most recently Nunnenkamp / Öhler (2011). 
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large OECD donors.3 Given the critique of Germany’s dispersive aid structures, these de-
cisions aimed at concentrating the country’s aid resources on a reduced number of recipi-
ents. This official partner country list allows for identifying which recipient country char-
acteristics had a significant effect on the official selection decisions. Moreover, we also 
analyse to which extent the partner list, defined in 2000, led to the desired concentration 
effect up until 2008. Secondly, this study then compares the selection decisions with the 
material allocation patterns of German aid after reunification in two sub-periods prior to 
the selection decisions, namely from 1992 to 1999, and from 2000 to 2008. Here, we ana-
lyse whether aid resources were allocated according to the same criteria as the official se-
lection of partner countries. Beyond testing for geopolitical, economic and diplomatic fac-
tors, this study uses newly constructed variables that control for the impact of bureaucratic 
interests of German aid agencies. Finally, another innovation of our study is that we not 
only employ standard linear estimation techniques but also more fine-tuned, non-linear es-
timators that have been used scarcely in aid-allocation literature. 
Overall, we find that neediness and levels of democracy had a strong and persistent impact 
on both country selection and resource allocation. However, the employment of non-linear 
estimation techniques shows a strong non-linear effect with regard to country neediness, 
where poverty orientation of country selection and aid allocation disappear below a rela-
tively high income-per-capita threshold. Beyond country neediness and democratic gov-
ernance, the third variable of continuous influence was population size. The latter variable, 
unfortunately, is difficult to interpret, given that large developing countries could have 
been preferred either because they hosted larger numbers of poor people or because they 
were more relevant for Germany in terms of economic and other global interests. 
Only in one selection decision (2008), but across the two allocation periods under investi-
gation, geostrategic considerations also impacted on German aid selectivity. The controls 
for path dependency and bureaucratic influences are also highly significant for country se-
lection and allocation patterns. However, due to problems of endogeneity, one should in-
terpret these results very cautiously and avoid conclusions that those factors have ob-
structed the development-oriented selectivity of German aid. Finally, the selection of spe-
cific partner countries in 2000 has not yet led to an increased de facto concentration of aid 
towards these countries, casting serious doubts on the effectiveness of this formal selec-
tion process. 
Overall, these results speak for a general development orientation of German aid after the 
end of the Cold War that was little influenced by changes in government. In this regard, 
our findings are compatible with those researchers who a) interpret German foreign policy 
as following the role model of a civilian power, and b) see only gradual alterations in 
German foreign policy after the country’s reunification. Still, our findings also suggest 
that foreign policy considerations and special interests of aid agencies have not been ab-
sent from German aid allocation – a finding which also remains when only looking at al-
location of resources exclusively under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development. Overall, the tension between “development orienta-
tion” and foreign policy interests and bureaucratic politics also prevailed in the German 
                                                 
3  To our knowledge, among bilateral donors, only the Netherlands and Sweden have adopted a similar 
approach of openly differentiating between partner and non-partner countries. The United Kingdom 
recently published a list of “focus countries” (Department for International Development – DFID 2011, 
20–21). 
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aid context – but to a lesser extent than previous criticism suggested. Beyond this, the 
preference for large countries and the strong path dependency of German aid also reflects 
the current insecurity of many donors to sharpen their selection and allocation criteria due 
to global changes of power and poverty during the last decade (Koch 2012). 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we provide an overview on the aid-
allocation literature, followed by a discussion of the German aid system. Section 3 ex-
plains our methodological proceedings and presents our empirical findings, while the last 
section concludes with an interpretation of our findings. 
2 Aid allocation and the German case 
2.1 Who gets aid and why: a short review 
Aid selectivity – the selection of countries and the allocation of resources according to 
specific criteria – is crucial for aid to reach its developmental goals. Prominent research 
shows that aid’s impact on growth increases when recipient countries are more demo-
cratic, less corrupt and more inclined towards sound macroeconomic policies (Svensson 
1999; Burnside / Dollar 2000). While the robustness of these results has been challenged 
(Roodman 2007), institutional quality is still considered a critical factor conditioning aid 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, a one-dimensional perspective of selectivity on the institu-
tional quality excludes the dimension of neediness. Because developing countries with 
good institutions are often among the less poor, selectivity should take into account both a 
country’s economic neediness and its institutional quality (Collier / Dollar 2001; Knack et 
al. 2010; Faust 2011). 
Regarding the level of interest within donor countries, this general allocation rule fits well 
with most citizens, who do not want their money to go to corrupt dictatorships but rather 
to poor countries that use it well (Lumsdaine 1993, 43). Nevertheless, aid is often said to 
be given for particular considerations of a donor government such as to promote economic 
interests, to strengthen political alliances or to heed the geopolitical considerations of the 
donor country. As realist scholars already speculated in the early days of foreign aid 
(Morgenthau 1962), these latter factors are the driving forces of aid allocation, while de-
velopment orientation remains marginal. 
Between 1970 and 1994, more open and democratic countries received more aid, but the 
political and strategic considerations of donors outweighed the effect of the recipient 
countries’ policies or political institutions (Alesina / Dollar 2000). Moreover, for a similar 
period, countries with a comparatively low level of corruption were not systematically fa-
voured over others (Alesina / Weder 2002). Indicators of human need, such as caloric in-
take and life expectancy, had no significant impact on aid allocation (Schraeder et al. 
1998) and overall aid flows favoured relatively rich developing countries, although this ef-
fect diminished with increasing per capita income (Alesina / Dollar 2000). However, stud-
ies focussing on more recent periods identify at least a partial trend towards more devel-
opment-friendly allocation, namely a country’s neediness and its institutional quality (Dol-
lar / Levin 2006; Claessens et al. 2009). Thus, the increasing criticism of the international 
aid industry, in combination with the end of the Cold War, could have impacted on policy-
makers’ allocation decisions. 
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At the same time, these and other studies revealed significant differences between the al-
location patterns of specific donors. Scandinavian states distributed their aid resources 
more according to criteria such as democracy levels or the respect for human rights (cf. 
Alesina / Weder 2002; Gates / Hoeffler 2004), while studies on US aid often identified 
that foreign policy interests systematically influenced allocation decisions (e.g. Drury et 
al. 2005). Former colonial powers, in turn, tended to systematically favour their former 
colonies (Alesina / Dollar 2000; Zanger 2000). With regard to multilateral organisations 
such as the IMF or the World Bank, the analyses almost consensually demonstrated the 
foreign policy impact of powerful member states on the lending and conditionality of 
these organisations.4 
Against this background, studies on the specific case of Germany – generally among the 
top four of bilateral donor countries – paint a rather heterogeneous picture and only sel-
dom treat German aid allocation as their principal matter of investigation (McKinlay 1978; 
Arvin / Drewes 2001; Nunnenkamp / Öhler 2011). With regard to recipient need, Mosley 
(1981) finds Germany to be responsive in the late 1970s. In a more recent study, Younas 
(2008) even identifies Germany as the only donor to be strongly poverty-oriented, a find-
ing substantiated by other recent studies (Nunnenkamp / Thiele 2006; Nunnen-
kamp / Öhler 2011). In contrast, other studies found that German aid focussed on middle-
income developing countries (Alesina / Weder 2002), a critique that also has been raised 
several times by OECD donor assessments (OECD-DAC 1998, 2006). Regarding aspects 
of good governance, findings are equally inconclusive. Carey (2007) notices that Germany 
rewards improvements in human rights. In contrast, Zanger (2000) does not find a  
significant impact of democracy levels or human rights on German aid allocation, while  
Berthélemy (2006, 191) classifies Germany as “moderately egoistic” regarding the con-
nection between aid and trade. 
Overall, this heterogeneity can have different causes. Beyond methodological shortcom-
ings of some studies,5 results may differ at least partly due to different time periods under 
consideration. In this regard, most studies either do not include the two decades after 
German reunification or do not link selected time periods to potential peculiarities of the 
German case. Therefore, the next section explores arguments that can be used for identify-
ing competing hypotheses about German aid-allocation patterns after reunification.   
                                                 
4  International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending during the heyday of structural adjustment in the 1980s and 
early 1990s was influenced by foreign policy interests of the United States (US) (Thacker 1999, 67). 
With regard to World Bank lending, a recipient’s country alignment with US positions in the United 
Nations (UN) (Barnebeck et al. 2006) or greater US financial and commercial interests in a country 
(Fleck / Kilby 2006) increase the probability and the volume of World Bank funding. A more recent 
study (1997–2003) suggests that the number of conditions on IMF loans were lower for closer allies (as 
measured by accordance of the borrowing and the recipient country’s voting patterns in the UN General 
Assembly) of the US and other G-7 countries, especially prior to elections (Dreher / Jensen 2007). 
5  For instance, Schrade’s analysis (1997) consists only of bivariate regressions and includes only the 
largest recipients of German aid, which creates strongly biased results. 
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2.2 Competing perspectives on German aid selectivity 
2.2.1 Development orientation vs. national self-interests? 
Germany’s development assistance traditionally puts strong emphasis on its “development 
orientation” – a fact that should be reflected in country selection and resource allocation. 
This tradition is partly reflected by the creation of an own ministry for foreign aid already 
in 1961: the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). De-
velopment orientation has been a major catchphrase of German aid officials from the be-
ginning, insisting on aid efficiency over aid quantity. Other allies, especially the United 
States, also expected that German aid would be more need-oriented because – unlike 
France or the United Kingdom – the country had no large former empire that it was 
obliged to support. Moreover, the country started to use aid to promote its Hallstein Doc-
trine, claiming to be the only legitimate representative for the whole of Germany (Schmidt 
2003, 478–488). In this context, policy-makers were concerned that the non-acceptance of 
the German Democratic Republic by the poorest countries depended in part upon the qual-
ity and honesty of West Germany’s foreign assistance (Schmidt 2003, 488; Nuscheler 
2007). This tradition also fits well with Germany’s moderate and cooperation-oriented 
foreign policy in the post-war period.  
According to one school of thought, post-war policy-makers slowly adopted the notion of 
a civilian power to enable Germany’s return to the community of states (Maull 1990; Har-
nisch / Maull 2001; Tewes 2002). Properties of a civilian power are the preference for 
multilateral solutions, negotiations and economic sanctions rather than violent measures 
(Maull 1990). According to this interpretation, the abdication from an aggressive pursuit 
of interests in Europe and elsewhere continued after reunification. From such a perspec-
tive, military involvement in Bosnia – and even in Kosovo and Afghanistan – can be in-
terpreted rather as a continuation of civilian politics with military measures, required by 
very adverse circumstances (Karp 2005). These military interventions were only approved 
after fierce domestic debates and are only perceived as legitimate when they have broad 
multilateral backing and are oriented towards the defence of civil goals – the major rea-
sons for the refusal to support the US intervention in Iraq. 
The concept of Germany as a civilian power has also been translated to the aid-related 
field of German democracy promotion (Wolff 2011), and also explicitly to the field of de-
velopment policy (Schrade 1997). Given that the concept of a civilian power also includes 
elements of social justice and a preference for non-repressive political order, a civilian 
power would prefer to allocate aid to poor but relatively democratic countries. Moreover, 
Germany as a civilian power would be reluctant, or at least very cautious, to invest sub-
stantial aid in countries affected by war and civil conflict and would value multilateral ini-
tiatives to make aid more effective. From such a perspective, the BMZ would be the most 
important player to promote such a role model in Germany’s development assistance; even 
more so to compensate for its relatively low political weight by positioning the German 
government as a champion of development-friendly aid (Nuscheler 2007, 683). 
When looking at the post-reunification period, the official allocation strategy matches such 
a role model. Under the conservative coalition (Christian Democrats and Liberals) in 
1991, the ministry defined criteria that were supposed to work as guiding principles for 
country selection and resource allocation. According to these criteria, German bilateral 
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development assistance should preferably engage with countries in need whose develop-
ment-oriented policies are embedded in democratic, rule-of-law-based and transparent 
state structures (BMZ 1995, 69). These criteria were also adopted under the more leftist 
coalition (Social Democrats and Green Party) in 1998/1999 and only modestly reformu-
lated in 2006 under the coalition of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, which 
put additional emphasis on cooperation with peaceful and cooperative states (BMZ 2007, 
15). Therefore, neediness of recipients and rule-of-law-based democracy were official cri-
teria for allocating German aid after the end of the Cold War, independent of changing 
government coalitions. The ministry also gave strong support to multilateral initiatives 
such as the Millennium Development Goals and the Paris Agenda of 2005; both initiatives 
aimed at promoting development-enhancing policies, respectively reforming international 
development cooperation towards more effective forms of interventions. 
However, an exclusive focus upon these potential reasons favouring development-oriented 
selectivity of German aid would exclude other aspects of the country’s international rela-
tions. Germany’s prosperity heavily relies on its export industries. Moreover, the end of 
the Cold War has changed its geopolitical position. Much of the debate on German foreign 
policy after reunification centred on the question about whether and how the government 
should use the country’s new political and economic weight (Peters 2001). Overall, a ma-
jority still perceive the European Union and other international organisations, such as the 
UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as the multilateral organisations 
through which Germany’s interests should be pursued. However, there has been a debate 
about whether the political and economic interests of the country should be followed more 
assertively. Advocates of such a position mainly belonging to the realist school of interna-
tional relations (Schöllgen 2000; Hacke 2003).  
Accordingly, German governments face incentives to use aid as a potential instrument for 
trade promotion. While development-oriented arguments for aid selectivity have prevailed 
in the domestic political debate, at least some conservative and liberal voices frequently 
have demanded that aid allocation should also be guided by Germany’s economic inter-
ests. The observation that German aid in prior periods went disproportionally to middle-
income countries could be explained by these countries’ relevance for German exports 
(Alesina / Weder 2002; Berthélemy 2006). This could also be in line with the explicit rec-
ognition of the BMZ during the last decade, namely that regional powers – or so-called 
anchor countries – should have a special status regarding German aid: not only because 
they house a large proportion of the world’s poor but also because of their importance for 
Germany’s external relations (BMZ 2004).  
Beyond trade interests, Germany’s exposed position towards Eastern Europe and its rela-
tive closeness to the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus could create a geographic 
bias in the distribution of aid. While during the Cold War period, relations with these re-
gions were restricted, new patterns of interdependence through economic relations, migra-
tion and security issues made these regions especially relevant for German foreign policy 
(Duffield 1998, 83–112). In a similar vein, Germany’s large share of Muslim migrants and 
the strategic importance of Turkey and northern Africa for the European Union could also 
impact on the country’s aid allocation. Thus, one could expect a geostrategic pattern in 
German aid selectivity: a concentration of German partner countries and aid resources to 
countries in Germany’s strategic environment. 
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2.2.2 Bureaucracy and organisational complexity 
The debate on mainstream allocation studies centres on the tension between development 
orientation and national self-interests. However, there is also a bureaucratic dimension of 
the “aid industry” (e.g. Easterly 2002; Gibson et al. 2006). According to this bureaucratic 
perspective, the increase of national and international aid agencies during the past decades 
has created a “cartel of good intentions” (Easterly 2002), whose bureaucracies have devel-
oped special interests of their own. An analysis of a country’s aid selectivity patterns 
therefore should try to include aspects of bureaucratic politics. In the German case, this 
dimension of foreign aid has mainly been characterised by the complex relationship be-
tween the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and the BMZ, as well as by the country’s organisa-
tional complexity regarding its implementing agencies.6 
Since its early stages, the BMZ has been struggling with the politically more important 
AA for more independence on the international stage (Schmidt 2003, 486). The resulting 
competition also has increased due to party politics. In most periods, the two ministries 
were headed by ministers from different coalition parties, with the junior coalition partner 
usually claiming the Foreign Office as second in rank after the Chancellery (Weller 2007, 
217–218).  
Rhetorically, the BMZ has acted as a promoter of development orientation, while the AA 
traditionally has put more emphasis on economic and geostrategic concerns. In this con-
flict, the BMZ attempted to augment its competences in foreign policy-making: for in-
stance, in 1972, the ministry took charge of bilateral and multilateral financial coopera-
tion, previously controlled by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
(BMWi). In 1998, the responsibility for dealing with the development policy of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the cooperation with eastern European and Newly Independent 
States followed (BMZ 2000, 31–32). That same year, the BMZ was promoted to constitute 
a member of the Federal Security Council (Weller 2007, 218). Yet, even though the minis-
try has enhanced its competences, central domains of development concern have remained 
beyond the ministry’s reach, e.g. trade policy, the policy towards the IMF, international 
debt management and humanitarian aid (Nuscheler 2007, 672). 
Despite its ambiguous position with regard to other ministries, the BMZ has maintained 
the advantage of disposing of the lion’s share of German official development aid (ODA) 
and of controlling a network of parastatal implementing agencies active all over the devel-
oping world (Weller 2007, 218). In theory, with command over large financial resources 
and executing agencies, the ministry could have implemented its vision of development-
oriented aid. In practice, the highly complex structure of state-owned agencies is said to 
have restricted the de facto assertiveness of the BMZ (Brombacher 2009).  
Financial and technical cooperation is carried out by different agencies in Germany. The 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) Development Bank is responsible for financial co-
operation while the German Technical Cooperation agency and two minor agencies were 
responsible for technical cooperation.7 Beyond this, large non-governmental organizations 
                                                 
6  For a scenario analysis on how the German ministerial organization of development cooperation and 
foreign policy could be reformed see Faust / Messner (2012). 
7  However, the three agencies of technical cooperation were merged into a single agency in 2011. 
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(NGOs) such as the German political foundations or the aid branches of the churches have 
also received large amounts of ODA from the BMZ. The resulting organisational com-
plexity has been repeatedly criticised by the OECD-DAC in its peer reviews (OECD-DAC 
1998, 2006). Not only has the organisational set-up with its corporatist elements created 
huge transaction costs in the administration of German aid flows. According to a common 
critique, this complex structure has also limited the ability of the BMZ to implement  
strategic decisions about content and allocation vis-à-vis implementing agencies, which 
have developed interests of their own (Nuscheler 2007).8 Moreover, the high level of pro-
ject proliferation (e.g. Acharya et al. 2006) across many sectors and countries has also 
been interpreted as being a result of this organisational complexity, where the division of 
resources among many parastatal agencies has dispersed activities and created strong path 
dependency rather than strategic focus. 
While the technical aid agencies were merged only in 2011, the BMZ was already re-
sponding to dispersive allocation patterns in the late 1990s. The ministry initiated an ex-
plicit selection process to concentrate German aid resources on a reduced number of coun-
tries in order to enhance the leverage of German aid. In 2000, this process resulted in a list 
of 70 official partner countries (BMZ 2000, 65). After an internal analysis, this list was 
further reduced to 58 countries in late 2008. Both lists were approved by parliament and 
are openly available, thus being valuable information for an analysis of Germany’s coun-
try selection process. 
3 Empirical analysis  
Given the previous arguments, one can derive competing hypotheses about the patterns of 
resource allocation and country selection in German aid after the end of the Cold War. 
There are arguments that suggest a strong development orientation of German aid. How-
ever, there are also context factors which make the hypothesis that German aid could have 
responded more to economic and geostrategic concerns more plausible. Finally, one can 
speculate about the impact of bureaucratic politics, which could not only have obstructed 
development-oriented selectivity patterns but which also could have made the implemen-
tation of formal policy changes more difficult. Without an evaluation of aid-selectivity 
patterns, however, one can freely choose which of these hypotheses meets one’s own real-
ity best. To obtain an assessment based on ample empirical evidence, the following sec-
tions will provide a statistical analysis of country selection and resource allocation.  
3.1 Periods, variables and data 
With regard to the selection of partner countries, the dependent variable is a dummy vari-
able indicating partner countries, as defined by the BMZ in 2000 and 2008 (for data 
                                                 
8  For example, the former German agency for technical cooperation (GIZ) has increased its revenue by 
providing services for other organizations than German ministries for why the agency is interested in 
maintaining a widespread network of local offices. The influence of BMZ over its aid agencies could 
also have been diminished by cuts on the personnel budgets of all federal ministries. These cuts led 
BMZ to outsource some of its competences to its technical and financial implementing agencies, while 
at the same time installing agency staff as consultants in the ministry. 
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sources, see Table A in the annex). For investigating allocation patterns, we divide the 
time after German reunification into two periods: 1992–1999 and 2000–2007.9 In the first 
period, the BMZ was led by conservative politicians under the coalition of Christian  
Democrats and Liberals. In the second period, the BMZ was led by a Social Democrat, in 
a coalition with the Green Party until 2005, and thereafter as a junior partner in a coalition 
with the Christian Democrats. Another reason for splitting the periods at the year 2000 is 
the growing international pressure to increase development orientation, exemplified by the 
high-level fora in Rome (2003) and Paris (2005). 
Dependent variables: In the allocation models, the dependent variable is gross disburse-
ments of German ODA in constant 2007 US dollars. We also use BMZ data, measured in 
1995 Euros. We chose gross amounts because they do not include repayments of credits 
and loans, which are highly dependent on previous aid flows or on recipients’ country man-
oeuvring space with regard to delaying or advancing debt repayments. Thus, only gross 
amounts are controlled by the current administration, making this measure appropriate for 
identifying a donor country’s determinants for aid allocation.10  
Following the recent literature (e.g. Nunnenkamp / Öhler 2011, 313; Neumayer 2003), this 
study uses absolute amounts of ODA instead of per capita values because donor organisa-
tions will be more likely to allocate a fixed overall amount to a given country rather than 
distribute aid on a per capita basis. We do not exclude emergency aid, because even this 
type of aid is not fully determined by external events such as natural disasters; it is often 
distributed according to political considerations on the donor side (Drury et al. 2005; 
Fink / Redaelli 2011). We also include debt relief in our ODA measures. While debt relief 
is not an actual flow of funds, debt relief can enable disencumbered nations to translate the 
clearance of their debt into economic manoeuvring room. The amount of manoeuvring 
space gained per dollar of debt relief may differ across cases, but even if it is low, the debt 
relief constitutes an important political gesture. We disaggregate the dependent variable 
based on the expectation that the BMZ itself could be more inclined to distribute aid “al-
truistically”.11 Total aid is the officially acknowledged German contribution to less-
developed countries. It is the standard dependent variable used in most allocation studies. 
In contrast, BMZ aid is calculated as total aid minus the funds channelled over federal 
ministries other than the BMZ, the federal states, churches, NGOs, political foundations, 
and debt relief and funds allocated to refugees in Germany. Thus, BMZ aid mainly com-
prises funds channelled through state-owned aid agencies of technical and financial coop-
eration. BMZ aid and total aid correlate at 0.55.  
Independent variables: We test selection and allocation with regard to size, neediness, 
governance and the conflict situation in a given country as well as with regard to possible 
national and bureaucratic interests. To avoid common co-linearity problems in allocation 
                                                 
9  For the main part of the analysis, we use data from OECD-DAC. For our analysis of BMZ-controlled 
allocation, we use disaggregate disbursement data from the BMZ, which is available only since 2000. 
10  Still, we acknowledge that, for studies attempting to identify the effect of aid on development (aid as 
independent variable), net amounts are more appropriate than gross amounts. Moreover, we check the 
robustness of our results when using net amounts. Results are similar when downweighting outliers via 
robust regression. 
11  Nunnenkamp provides disaggregated data on German aid but only for a relatively short time span 
(2005–2007). Few other studies disaggregate aid data further. Drury et al. (2005) look at humanitarian 
aid, Neumayer (2003) at food aid, and Dreher et al. (2008) use aid classified by sectors. 
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studies, which often result from including too many variables under the constraint of a 
limited number of observations (here 118), we attempt to construct a parsimonious model. 
More concretely, we do not include more than one variable for each potential factor of in-
fluence.  
Regarding size and neediness, we follow the standard approach and use population and in-
come per capita as independent variables. As a robustness check, we substitute income per 
capita with the infant mortality per 100,000 until the age of five, which is considered as 
one of the most appropriate measures for poverty. However, we think that income per cap-
ita is more appropriate to measure the neediness of a recipient country for aid-allocation 
considerations because it also accounts for the domestic redistribution potential: rich coun-
tries with high infant mortality rates should be able to support their populations without 
development aid. Governance is measured with the Worldwide Governance Indicators’ 
Voice and Accountability, backed by the average of Freedom House’s Civil Liberties and 
Political Rights and by the Polity IV score. 
Possible German interests are measured with three variables: the economic importance as 
the value of German trade (exports plus imports); geographic proximity as the minimum 
distance to Germany; and political proximity as the degree of UN voting accordance with 
Germany when voting in the General Assembly. War is a dummy variable that takes the 
value “1” when a country experiences an armed conflict with more than 1,000 cumulated 
battle-deaths in any year of the considered period and “0” in the remaining cases. In alter-
native models, we also check the impact of post-war situations; post-war situations being 
defined as when a country has experienced a war in the five years preceding the year or 
period under investigation. 
To test agency interests and path dependency, we include previous partner country status, 
previous German aid, German agency offices and German projects. Due to data availabil-
ity constrains, we run these models only for the 2008 selection and the 2000–2008 alloca-
tion period. In the selection model, offices and projects are lagged by four to five years to 
circumvent problems of endogeneity.12 In the 2000–2008 allocation model, we use infor-
mation from 1999. 
For most other control variables in the selection models, we use three-year averages with a 
lag of one or two years to the year of decision. In the allocation models, we use – where 
possible – eight-year averages ranging from 1991 to 1998 and 1999 to 2006 respectively, 
assuming that there are no problems of endogeneity with these controls. Finally, we re-
strict our analysis to developing countries as defined by the OECD and exclude micro-
states with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, as we expect that decision-makers do not con-
sider these states to be important aid targets. This results in a list of 118 countries.13   
                                                 
12  Agency offices and projects emerge where aid is directed to. In 1999, they correlate at 0.58 and 0.67 
respectively with aid given from 1992 to 1999, but only at 0.30 and 0.35 with respectively with aid 
given from 2000–2007. 
13  East Timor was excluded because it was not an independent country before 2002. 
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3.2 Empirical results and interpretation 
3.2.1 Country selection 
Taking into account only the countries in our sample, the German partner country list was 
reduced from 68 countries in 2000 to 55 in 2008 (dropping 22 and admitting 9) and to 46 
in 2011 (dropping nine and admitting one). The latest drop-outs are Angola, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, China, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Syria, while the 
latest admission is Togo.14 
To investigate the effects of our independent variables on the probability of a developing 
country being selected as a partner country, we use logistic regression for the three selec-
tion years. In 2011, the logit model indicates a significant impact of country size and dem-
ocracy level (see eq. 1 in Table 1). While the highly significant governance variable con-
forms with a developmental approach, country size is more difficult to interpret because 
large countries may be more important than smaller countries, regarding both recipient 
need and donor interest considerations. All else being equal, larger countries are more im-
portant in reducing global poverty and are more important for trade. Interestingly, our ex-
plicit measure for country neediness – income per capita – does not have a significant lin-
ear relationship with the probability of becoming a partner country. We suspect that there 
might be a non-linear relationship and thus turn to Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) 
with cubic splines (Hastie / Tibshirani 1990; Keele 2008). These models break variables 
into several sections and fit polynomials to these sections.15 In the GAM, income turns out 
to be significant when allowing for a non-linear specification.16 While the impact of in-
come is still zero for the poorest countries, starting at around US$ 4,000 to 5,000 per cap-
ita, it becomes increasingly negative (see eq. 2 and Figure 1).  
Thus, our basic approach of using the GAM instead of an ordinary least squares (OLS) es-
timator is better suited for specifying the apparent middle-income-country bias found by 
previous studies. While rich countries were less likely to become German partner coun-
tries, it did not make a difference if a country was poor or very poor. Moreover, for the 
2011 partner country selection, we do not find any of our interest variables to have a 
strong correlation with the selection outcome. 
In the GAM selection models for 2000 and 2008, population size, need and democratic 
governance were again strongly correlated with the selection of partner countries. Only, in 
2008, two more variables turned out to be of statistical significance. The first was distance 
from Germany, with the expected negative sign, suggesting that geopolitical considera-
tions have played a role in the selection process. Moreover, countries at war were signifi-
cantly less likely to be selected as partner countries. 
                                                 
14  Some of these countries are still listed as partners for “regional or thematic cooperation”. 
15  We also use GAMs to assess which independent variables should be logged to improve model fit. We 
find that logging population, income per capita, distance and trade provides better results. 
16  Importantly, when comparing different GAM specifications with statistical tests (not shown), the model 
fit suggests for all years under consideration, that only income should be modelled in a semi-parametric 
fashion. Shape and threshold are very similar to the effect in 2011 (see Figure 1). 
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In order to identify whether the strength of these factors concerning partner-country selec-
tion changed over time, we put all years into a joint model by appending one year’s data-
set to the other. The coefficients are then estimated using year dummies, allowing for a di-
rect comparison of their size (eq. 5).17 Over the three selection periods, the changes are 
modest and of little statistical relevance. Instead, the orientation towards poor and demo-
cratic countries is persistent with the democracy variable and is of special importance in 
2008. For the same year, the avoidance of war-affected countries appears to be an excep-
tion. 
The remaining models in Table 1 incorporate potential path dependencies. As expected, 
we find partner country status in 2011 to be dependent upon partner country status in 2000 
and on previous aid flows (eq. 5 and 6). Also, countries that had German aid agency of-
fices four years prior to the decision were more probable to become partner countries (eq. 
7). The same is true for countries with many German aid projects (eq. 8). In all of these 
specifications, both per capita income and democracy levels lose explanatory power com-
pared to our base model (eq. 1). However, it would be misleading to conclude that country 
neediness and governance has not played an important role in the selection of partner 
countries. It is important to note that this loss of significance regarding those two variables 
is very likely due to endogeneity. The establishment of agencies or the prior allocation of 
resources then is a function of selection and allocation decisions that have included criteria 
of development orientation. Thus, equations 5 to 8 are not evidence against development-
oriented country selection but instead point to a high level of continuity and path depend-
ency. To see whether criteria of development orientation and path dependency are not only 
relevant for political commitments but also are reflected in the de facto allocation of fi-
nancial resources, we now turn to the study of allocation patterns.   
                                                 
17  In the joint models, we exclude East Timor. 
Figure 1: Non-linear effects in selection models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From left to right: income per capita 2011 (logged) (Table 1, eq. 2), income per capita 2008 (logged) (eq. 3). 
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3.2.2 Allocation of aid 
Has the selection of partner countries led to an increased concentration of funds towards 
these partner countries? Figure 2 shows gross German aid transfers. The dark grey sec-
tions of the bars represent funds received by year-2000 partner countries. The light grey 
sections represent funds going to other countries. The strong increase over time of total aid 
to non-partner countries (left-hand plot) was caused by the enormous amounts of debt re-
lief going to Iraq (2005–2008), Botswana (2008), Liberia (2008) and others. But even 
without debt relief, neither total aid nor BMZ aid showed increased concentrations to part-
ner countries (centre and right-hand plots). The partner-country share remained, from 
2000 to 2008, at about 80 per cent of total aid, excluding debt relief. This stagnation im-
plies that the decision to reduce partner countries has not (yet) had financial consequences.  
What hinders implementation? It could be that Germany, as a large trading nation, has so 
many interactions with most countries around the world that it is just not politically feas-
ible to cut aid ties in less than a decade. Another explanation could lie in the bureaucratic 
inertia deriving from the complex German aid agency structure that – for reasons of self-
preservation – try to prevent or delay aid concentration. Unfortunately, simple descriptive 
statistics will not provide an answer to these questions. Thus, we investigate the allocation 
of aid using multivariate regression.18 
We first use an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to estimate the effects of our inde-
pendent variables on the amount of aid that developing countries have received from 
                                                 
18 Aid concentration curves are an alternative representation of overall poverty orientation (see Baulch 
2006), but their reach is limited because they are bivariate and do not allow to control for other factors. 
Aid concentration curves of German aid (not shown) suggest that poverty orientation may be slowly 
increasing in the 2000-2008 period. 
Figure 2: German ODA to partner countries, 2000–2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
German ODA to partner countries, 2000–2008 
 
Source: own calculations from BMZ data (billions of constant 1995 euros). 
 
Source: own calculations from BMZ data (billions of constant 1995 Euros). 
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Germany.19 We also apply GAMs to account for non-linearities and robust regression 
(RReg) to weight down the influence of outliers (Andersen 2008). To identify whether the 
selection decisions in 2000 and in late 2008 are determined by the same criteria as the 
concrete allocation patterns, we divide the post–Cold War phase into two periods, namely 
1992–1999 and 2000–2008. 
In the 1992–1999 period, population, income and democratic governance are highly sig-
nificant with the expected signs (eq. 1 in Table 2). Both countries that trade more with 
Germany and war countries are predicted to receive higher aid amounts. The GAM results 
show the same pattern of significance, with income being non-linear (eq. 2). Only in the 
GAM does UN voting turn out to be significant, although with an unexpected negative 
sign. Figure 3 shows that income had an effect of zero up to an income of around US$ 
4,000, which is about the threshold that the World Bank uses to distinguish lower-middle-
income countries from upper-middle-income countries. In other words, doubling the in-
come of a country from US$ 2,000 to 4,000 would not have changed the amount of aid a 
country could expect from Germany, while doubling the income from US$ 4,000 to 8,000 
would have decreased the expectations significantly. An analysis of influential observa-
tions shows that our results might be influenced by some very unusual observations. In-
stead of completely excluding these observations, we weight them down, using robust re-
gression. In the RReg model (eq. 3), both trade and UN voting lose much of their impact 
and distance becomes significant: countries geographically closer to Germany received 
more aid in the 1992 to 1999 period. 
The 2000–2008 period shows similar results regarding population, income and governance 
(eq. 4–6). Distance is consistently significant across all specifications. The GAM results 
indicate a positive, significant and non-linear impact of trade, which levels off between 
US$ 40 and 150 million. While it is probable that trade actually picks up some German 
economic interests here, it could also be an indicator of absorptive capacity: most coun-
tries trade with Germany, and those few that trade less are, ceteris paribus, possibly not 
capable of taking part in complex international transactions, including aid reception.20 
The joint allocation model (Table 2, eq. 7) shows not much difference in the impact of in-
come and democracy levels in 2000–2008 compared to 1992–1999, but it shows a 
strongly increasing effect of distance. However, when testing for influential observations, 
we find that the OLS model may be biased. We thus run a joint robust regression model 
(eq. 8). In this model, democracy levels, population, income and distance are significant in 
both periods and the 1992–1999 coefficients are close to the 2000–2008 coefficients. As 
differences are small, however, there is not much evidence for changing allocation pat-
terns – again suggesting a strong path dependence. 
                                                 
19  Most aid allocation studies apply two-stage or tobit models to deal with the truncated nature of the 
dependent variable resulting from the fact that not all donors give aid to all recipients (Berthélemy / 
Tichit 2004; Neumayer 2003). As Germany gives aid not only to its partner countries, but to almost all 
countries in our sample, we can thus dispense of such a two-stage procedure. Countries which receive 
zero total aid in our dataset are the Comoros (2000–2008, OECD data), Belarus, Ukraine (both 1992–
1999, OECD data) and Guinea-Bissau (2000–2008, BMZ data). 
20 The countries with the lowest trade volumes with Germany include Bhutan, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, 
Comoros, Solomon Islands and Central African Republic. 
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8 10 12 14 16 186 7 8 9 106 7 8 9
Moving from temporal to institutional disaggregation, we look at total aid versus BMZ aid 
(Table 3). Was the ministry’s allocation pattern different from the overall allocation pat-
tern? We use BMZ data now because it allows for a better identification of resources con-
trolled by the ministry. Using BMZ data on total aid in the OLS and GAM specifications 
does not change any substantial results as compared to using the OECD data (eq. 1 and 2). 
Population, income, democracy levels, distance and – only in the GAM specification – 
trade have a significant impact on allocation. Looking only at aid flows controlled by the 
BMZ (eq. 3 and 4), we find distance to be significant only in the GAM model. The re-
maining variables do not change much either, implying that aid resources directly under 
the responsibility of the ministry were not allocated in a more development-friendly way 
than overall German aid.21 
How do the total aid results hold when testing for path dependency and agency interest? 
All newly introduced variables are highly significant (Table 3, eq. 5–9), but they do not 
change the effects of the other variables substantially as compared to the GAM base model 
(eq. 2). Previous ODA has a non-linear effect, which sets in after an average of EUR 4 
million per year. Income and trade approximately retain the functional form of previous 
models. Our path dependency and agency interest models probably suffer from endogene-
ity problems, but the fact that the other effects remain stable gives strong support to the 
hypothesis that need and governance are actually taken into account by the decision-
makers. 
                                                 
21  We also tested how aid that is not controlled by BMZ (total aid minus BMZ aid) is allocated and found 
that it produces a pattern that is very similar to total aid (results not shown).  
Figure 3: Non-linear effects in allocation models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From left to right: income per capita 1992–1999 (logged) (Table 2, eq. 2), income per capita 2000–2008 
(logged) and trade 2000–2008 (logged) (eq. 5). 
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4 Conclusion and outlook 
From a more general perspective, the previous analysis of country selection and resource 
allocation of German aid has introduced several new features to the study of aid-allocation 
patterns by a) explicitly examining official partner country lists, b) using new estimation 
technique to identify non-linear effects of explanatory variables and c) by explicitly con-
sidering bureaucratic agency interests. These features allowed for a more encompassing 
analysis of aid selectivity of one of the most important bilateral donors and can at least 
partially be applied to other donor countries or organisations. 
With respect to the German case, there is significant evidence that neediness and dem-
ocracy levels of developing countries have indeed played a crucial role, both in the selec-
tion and in the allocation process. These findings support the notion that development ori-
entation has been a crucial feature of German aid. They also support those who argue that 
German foreign policy is guided by the principles of a civilian power. Yet, while needi-
ness and democracy levels (as measures of development orientation) have played the most 
important role, they are far from determining country selection and aid allocation. 
Explicit variables on economic self-interest and political allies have not been identified as 
significant factors. Yet, the significant impact of a developing country’s size can be inter-
preted ambiguously, because large countries not only have larger numbers of poor people, 
but generally they are are also more important in economic and political terms. Moreover, 
the non-linear models confirm that per-capita aid matters for decisions on allocation, but 
they also refine this very coarse message: they show that the positive effect sets in only at 
a relatively high threshold of US$ 4,000. Below that threshold, any greater level of need 
has no additional impact. All else being equal, low-income and lower-middle-income 
countries must expect the same chances of becoming a partner country and they must ex-
pect the same amount of aid. These findings might be related to recent debates on how to 
allocate aid in a changing world, where large middle-income countries are not only rele-
vant for poverty alleviation because they host most of the world’s poor people, but also 
because of their rising importance in global affairs directly linked to German foreign pol-
icy interests. 
Additionally, the only donor interest variable that has a more or less robust effect on the 
2008 selection and recent allocation patterns is geographic distance. This finding can be 
explained by the changing international context following the country’s reunification 
process, which has not only changed its geopolitical position but also increased the poten-
tial for Germany to react, via its aid policy, to the increasing interdependencies with coun-
tries neighbouring the European Union. However, given the impact of neediness and dem-
ocracy levels as crucial development-oriented criteria of aid selectivity, this finding does 
not necessarily contradict the relevance of the civilian power concept for German aid. 
Finally, our analysis also highlighted the path dependency of German aid selectivity. A 
large percentage of German aid goes where it has gone before. The strong impact of part-
ner country status in the year 2000 on aid allocation in the 2000–2008 period might at first 
sight be interpreted as proof of aid concentration to partner countries. However, descrip-
tive statistics show that the impact is mainly due to the fact that just those countries that 
were receiving the vast majority of aid at the time of decision were chosen as partner 
countries. The relative amount of aid going to these countries has not increased noticeably 
Jörg Faust / Sebastian Ziaja 
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since then. We also detect a strong influence of agency interests for both selection and al-
location. Despite unresolved concerns of endogeneity, these two results jointly support the 
hypothesis that the complex German aid agency structure makes it difficult to change allo-
cation patterns. A complex institutional arrangement with many veto players has probably 
led to a lock-in effect of development orientation of German aid allocation – a finding that 
fits with the general interpretation of the overall path dependency of German foreign pol-
icy. Yet, one should be very cautious when inferring from selectivity patterns of a donor 
country on the effectiveness of these resources for, e.g., economic growth or poverty alle-
viation. Even if there is a relatively broad consensus that aid resources are particularly ef-
fective for promoting economic development in relatively poor but relatively well-
governed countries, fulfilling certain allocation criteria are at best necessary but not suffi-
cient criteria for improving the effectiveness of foreign aid. 
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Table A:  Data sources 
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lagged  OECD 2012; BMZ (various years) 
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Population (ln) Heston / Summers / Aten 2009; Gleditsch 2002 
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Distance (ln) Gleditsch / Ward 2001 
Trade (ln) Statistisches Bundesamt 2009 
UN voting accordance Gartzke 2008 
German agency offices dummy, lagged GTZ (various years); KfW (various years) 
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Freedom House Freedom House 2010 
Polity Marshall / Jaggers 2010 
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